



TikTok's DSA Transparency Report

October to December 2023



At TikTok, our mission is to inspire creativity and bring joy. The safety and well-being of our community is our priority, and we have more than 40,000 trust and safety professionals globally working to protect our users. TikTok has a strong track record in proactive transparency reporting; we have been publishing [transparency reports](#) since 2019. We also report on our efforts to combat disinformation on our platform under the [Code of Practice on Disinformation](#) on a six monthly basis. Building on our transparency efforts and in line with our obligations under the Digital Services Act (**DSA**), we are pleased to publish our second DSA transparency report for the reporting period of 1 October 2023 to 31 December 2023.

We have a number of measures designed to keep users safe across priority areas, including from illegal and other harmful content. We are pleased to report on the numbers underlying these measures including the additional reporting option we have implemented to allow people to report content in the European Union they believe is illegal. Some key points in our report are:

- During Q4 2023, we proactively removed approximately 13 million items of violative content under our Policies (defined below).
- In the same time period we also received around 131,000 illegal content reports corresponding to approximately 63,000 unique pieces of content. We estimate 38% of those were found to violate our Policies or local law and were actioned.
- TikTok has more than 6,000 people dedicated to moderating content, covering at least one official language for each of the 27 European Union Member States.

Providing transparency to our community about how we keep them safe is an ongoing commitment that has no finish line. We are pleased to have built upon the efforts of our first DSA transparency report, for example, by providing greater granularity on metrics relating to accuracy and error rates, as well as those relating to our appeals, in this second DSA transparency report. We acknowledge that we still have more work to do and we have set out the limitations to our reporting in each of the annexes. We are continuing to work hard to address these points in future DSA transparency reports.

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Section 1. Content moderation

TikTok strives to foster an open and inclusive environment where people can create, find community, and be entertained. To maintain that environment, we take action upon content and accounts that violate our [Terms of Service](#), [Community Guidelines](#), or [Advertising Policies](#) (together, our **Policies**). We are committed to being transparent with our community about the moderation actions we take. The number and type of restrictions we impose as part of our content moderation activities are available at **Annex A**.

Our Policies are the starting point when it comes to how we form and operate our content moderation strategies and practices and they contain provisions which prohibit various forms of illegal and other harmful content. We use a combination of automation and human moderation to identify, review, and action content that violates our Policies.

Key principles

We operate our content moderation processes using automation and human moderation in accordance with the following four pillars, which provide that we will:

1. Remove violative content from the platform that breaks our rules (noting that we do not allow several types of mature content themes, including gory, gruesome, disturbing, or extremely violent content);
2. Age-restrict mature content (that does not violate our Community Guidelines but which contains mature themes) so it is only viewed by adults (18 years and older);
3. Maintain For You feed eligibility standards to help ensure any content that may be promoted by the recommendation system is appropriate for a broad audience; and
4. Empower our community with information, tools, and resources.

Automated Review

We place considerable emphasis on proactive detection to remove violative content. Content that is uploaded to the platform is first reviewed by our automated moderation technology, which aims to identify content that violates our Policies before it is viewed or shared by other people on the platform or reported to us. While undergoing this review, the content is visible only to the uploader.

If our automated moderation technology identifies content that is a potential violation, it will either be automatically removed from the platform or flagged for further review by our human moderation teams. In line with our safeguards to help ensure accurate decisions are made, automated removal is applied when violations are the most clear-cut.

We use a variety of automated tools, including:

- Computer Vision models, which help to detect objects (for example visual signals, emblems, logos and objects that are known to be associated with extremist and hate groups) so it can be determined whether the content likely contains material which violates our Policies.
- Keyword lists and models are used to review text and audio content to detect material in violation of our Policies. We work with various external experts, like our [fact-checking partners](#), to inform our keyword lists.
- Where we have previously detected content that violates our Policies, we use de-duplication and hashing technologies that enable us to recognise copies or near copies of such content. This is used to prevent further re-distribution of violative content on the platform. We work with external groups, such as [Tech Against Terrorism](#) on hate or violent extremist content, who help us to more quickly detect and remove violative content that has already been identified off the platform.

We are continuing to invest in improving the precision of our automated moderation systems so that we can more effectively remove violative content at scale, while also reducing the number of incorrect removals. If users or advertisers believe we have made a mistake, they can [appeal](#) the removal of their content.

In assessing the effectiveness of our automated moderation technologies, our second DSA transparency report captures a broader range of automated enforcement actions when compared with our previous report. We consider

that the appropriate indicator of accuracy is the proportion of videos and ads where the original enforcement decision was upheld or maintained. We consider that the appropriate indicator of error is the proportion of videos and ads where the original enforcement decision was overturned. For Q4 2023, the accuracy rate for our automated moderation technologies for video and ads was 98.6% and the error rate was 1.4% (see **Annex B** for more information).

Human moderation

In order to support fair and consistent review of potentially violative content, moderators work alongside our automated moderation systems and take into account additional context and nuance which may not always be picked up by technology.

Human moderation also helps improve our automated moderation systems by providing feedback for the underlying machine learning models to strengthen our ongoing detection capabilities. This continuous improvement helps to reduce the volume of potentially distressing videos that moderators view and enables them to focus more on content that requires a greater understanding of context and nuance (such as misinformation, hate speech and harassment). The responsibilities of our content moderators includes:

- **Reviewing content flagged by technology:** When our automated moderation systems identify potentially problematic content but cannot make an automated decision to remove it, they send the content to our moderation teams for further review. To support this work, we have developed technology that can identify potentially violative items – for example, emblems associated with extremist groups – in video frames, so that content moderators can carefully review the video and the context in which it appears. This technology improves the efficiency of moderators by helping them more adeptly identify violative images or objects, quickly recognise violations, and make decisions accordingly.
- **Reviewing reports from its community:** We offer our community easily accessible in-app and online reporting tools so they can flag any content or account they feel is in violation of our Policies or is illegal. These reports are an important component of our content moderation process, however, the vast majority of removed content is identified proactively before it is reported to us (see **Annex A** for more information).
- **Reviewing popular content:** We manually review video content when it reaches certain levels of popularity in terms of the number of video views, reducing the risk of violative content being shown in the For You Feed or otherwise being widely disseminated.
- **Assessing appeals:** If someone disagrees with our decision to restrict or remove their content or an account, they can [appeal](#) the decision for reconsideration. These appeals may be sent to moderators to decide if the content should be reinstated on the platform or the account reinstated.

Section 2. Illegal content reports

Our Policies apply to all accounts and content on the platform, and they often align with, and sometimes go beyond, local law requirements. While we primarily enforce our Policies at our own initiative through automated and human moderation, users can also use the reporting functions to alert TikTok to content they believe violates our Policies. The number of reports made in the European Union to TikTok during the period 1 October 2023 to 31 December 2023 is at **Annex C**. The DSA envisages that trusted flaggers will also be able to submit illegal content reports. However, we did not receive any illegal content reports from trusted flaggers during this reporting period given there were none designated under the DSA at this time.

As part of our requirements under the DSA, we have introduced an [additional reporting channel](#) for our community in the European Union to 'Report Illegal Content,' which enables users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. When users report suspected illegal content, they will be asked to select a category of illegal content they are reporting under. Reporters are also asked to provide additional information, such as: the country in question; if possible, the specific law in question; and a clear explanation as to why they think the content violates the law. If the report is incomplete (for example, it does not provide enough information for us to assess if the content is illegal) or materially unsubstantiated, the report may be rejected. The reporter will be notified of this decision and provided with an opportunity to re-submit their report with more information. This helps us properly and effectively consider and respond to each report.

Illegal content reports are assessed through a combination of automation or human review. TikTok will review the content against our Policies and where a violation is detected, the content may be removed globally. If it is not removed, our illegal content moderation team will further review the content to assess whether it is unlawful in the relevant jurisdiction - this assessment is undertaken by human review. In making our determination, TikTok is required to balance any competing legal rights, such as freedom of speech. Content found to be illegal will generally be restricted in the country where it is illegal or, in some cases, across the EEA region or by removing the content from the platform entirely. Those who report suspected illegal content will be notified of our decision, including if we consider that the content is not illegal. Users who disagree can [appeal](#) those decisions using the appeals process.

Section 3. TikTok's moderators

Our mission to inspire creativity and bring joy to people around the world is made possible by the critical work of our content moderators who review and remove illegal and other harmful content and behaviour from the platform. TikTok has 6,287 people dedicated to the moderation of content in the European Union as of the end of December 2023 (see **Annex D** for more information).

Our Trust & Safety teams lead our approach to content moderation across the European Union and are responsible for the development of our Community Guidelines and related moderation policies and for the moderation of content. For the European Union, TikTok's Trust & Safety work is led from Dublin, Ireland and key members of the global Trust & Safety leadership team are based in the same location. Our Monetisation Integrity and Business Integrity teams also play a key role in the moderation of ads and branded content, and are responsible for the development of TikTok's Advertising Policies and related moderation policies.

Training

To ensure a consistent understanding and application of our Policies, all content moderator personnel receive training across our relevant Policies. All content moderators undergo training on TikTok's content moderation systems and moderator wellness issues. Personnel involved in reviewing reported illegal content receive additional focused training on assessing the legality of reported illegal content.

Content moderation training materials are kept under review to ensure that they are accurate and current. Such materials include clearly defined learning objectives to ensure our content moderators understand the core policy issues and their underlying policy rationale, key terms and policy exceptions (where applicable).

Members of our Trust & Safety teams attend regular internal sessions dedicated to knowledge sharing and discussion about relevant issues and trends, which include input from external experts. For example, in the lead up to the European Parliamentary elections in June 2024, our internal teams will benefit from the insights and market expertise shared by experts from various EU Member States, particularly from the fact-checking community, who we invite as part of our ongoing Election Speaker Series. Our teams also participate in various external events to share expertise and support their continued professional learning. These engagements contribute to the team's awareness of the risks which may arise on the platform, which in turn informs our approach to content moderation. For example, in 2023 members of our Trust & Safety team attended the Terrorism and Social Media Conference (Swansea University), the [Association of Internet Researchers Conference \(Philadelphia\)](#), the [Trust and Safety Research Conference](#) at Stanford University, and the [Global Fact 10 | Global Fact-Checking Conference](#).

Support

At TikTok, building and maintaining a safe experience for our community is of the utmost importance. Our primary focus is on preventative care measures to minimise the risk of psychological injury through well-timed support, training and tools, from recruitment through to onboarding and throughout their time moderating TikTok content, that help foster resilience, while minimising the risk of psychological injury. These may include tools and features to allow Trust & Safety employees to control exposure to graphic content when reviewing or moderating content, including grayscaling, muting and blurring; training for managers to help them identify when a team member may need additional well-being support; and clinical and therapeutic support.



While we focus on preventative care measures, our moderators may be required at times to review potentially harmful content, which makes providing the right support essential. We recognise this, and are focused on and committed to prioritising the health, safety, and well-being of our people. We use an evidence-based approach to develop programs and resources that support moderators' psychological well-being.

For our Trust & Safety teams, we also provide them with membership to the Trust and Safety Professional Association. This membership allows them to access resources for career development, participate in workshops and events, and connect with a network of peers across the industry.

Qualifications & linguistic expertise

Some of the issues which arise on the platform are highly localised in terms of language and region, which requires deep knowledge and awareness of relevant cultural nuances, terms and context.

To address this, and ensure its content moderators are appropriately qualified to make decisions, we have regional policy teams in each region, which includes coverage for all European Union Member States, for example with either designated policy country managers for larger countries or policy managers covering a number of smaller countries.

Based primarily in Dublin, the role of our EMEA regional policy team is to bring regional insights, cultural context, local knowledge and policy understanding to ensure that global moderation policies are localised as appropriate for the particular context (i.e. across various countries and regions within the European Union). The team plays an important role in risk detection and identification and mitigation at a regional and local level through its subject matter expertise; close collaboration with cross-functional teams to detect regional/local trends (such as localised trends); engagement with external experts, such as NGOs and civil society organisations, and government authorities.

The localised policy outputs from the EMEA regional policy team enable our content moderation teams to take a regionally informed approach to content moderation (e.g. rapidly evolving alternative vocabulary or terminology in relation an unfolding election issue, which may vary/evolve over time and as between countries and languages).

We have also established a number of specialised Trust & Safety moderation teams to assist our moderators review content relating to complex issues. For example, assessing harmful misinformation requires additional context and assessment by our misinformation moderators who have enhanced training, expertise and tools to identify such content, including our global repository of previously fact-checked claims from the IFCN-accredited fact-checking partners and direct access to our fact-checking partners where appropriate.

We moderate content in more than 70 languages globally and we are transparent in our [regular Community Guidelines Enforcement Reports](#) about the primary languages our moderators work in globally. We have language capabilities covering at least one official language for each of the 27 European Union Member States, as well as a number of other languages that are commonly spoken in the region (for example, Arabic and Turkish). This language capability complements our awareness-raising materials, like the Community Guidelines, that are also available in multiple languages. We also have moderation personnel that are not assigned to a particular language, who assist with reviewing content such as photos and profiles.

Section 4. Orders from government authorities

We may receive requests from government authorities in the European Union to remove content. When we receive such requests from government authorities, we review and take action upon content in line with our Policies and the applicable law. During the period 1 October 2023 and 31 December 2023, we received 77 requests from government authorities in the European Union to remove content (see **Annex E** for more information).

We may also receive requests from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure. We respond to these in a manner that respects the privacy and other rights of our users. Any request we receive is carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis in line with our [Law Enforcement Guidelines](#). Our policies and procedures

govern how we handle and respond to such requests and only disclose user data where a request is based on a valid legal process. During the period 1 October 2023 and 31 December 2023, we received 2,715 information requests from government authorities in the European Union (see **Annex F** for more information).

Section 5. Complaints and disputes

Complaints

Anyone can report content on TikTok they believe violates our Policies or applicable laws and can appeal if they disagree with the outcome of our decision. Users and advertisers are also provided with a notification where we determine that they have violated our Policies and applicable laws, and they are provided with an opportunity to appeal against any action we have taken. We provide information to users about how to appeal a decision in relation to a report they have made, or how to appeal a decision affecting their content or account [here](#). We report on the number of appeals, and the action we take in response to those appeals, in **Annex G**.

Disputes submitted to out-of-court dispute settlement bodies

The DSA provides users of the platform with the right to access a third party out-of-court dispute settlement process to resolve any disputes that they may have with us regarding moderation actions (including in relation to any appeals). No requests to resolve disputes using these processes were received during the period 1 October 2023 and 31 December 2023.

Section 6. Suspensions

We may suspend or permanently ban accounts where we identify violations of our Policies, including where:

- the user does not meet the minimum age or other requirements as indicated in our Terms of Service;
- the account impersonates another person or entity in a deceptive manner;
- a user has a severe violation on their account (such as promoting or threatening violence);
- an account reaches the strike threshold for multiple violations within a policy or feature; or
- multiple violations of our Intellectual Property Policy.

We report on the number of accounts suspended during the period 1 October 2023 and 31 December 2023 for violations of our Policies in **Annex A**. Separate to the suspension of accounts for violations of our Policies, TikTok did not impose suspensions on accounts for the frequent provision of manifestly illegal content. Separate to the rejection of incomplete or materially unsubstantiated illegal content reports, TikTok did not suspend the processing of illegal content reports or complaints due to individuals frequently submitting manifestly unfounded notices or manifestly unfounded complaints.

Section 7. Average monthly recipients per Member State

We report on the average number of 'monthly active recipients', broken down per each of the 27 European Union Member States in **Annex H** during the period 1 August 2023 - 31 January 2024



Annex A - TikTok's own-initiative content moderation

This Annex A provides the number of moderation actions we took against content and accounts under our Policies. It consists of numbers of video and LIVE content removed and restricted, for example according to the application of our [Eligibility Standards](#) or [Content Levels](#), as well as restrictions imposed on access to features (i.e. service restriction), and the number of ads removed. We are working hard to ensure we can provide numbers for the remaining moderation actions across all of our features in future transparency reports.

Content-level moderation actions

This table sets out the number of the content-level moderation actions taken where content is found to violate our Policies, broken down by the type of policy that the content has been actioned under and by the moderation action taken.

| | | Type of moderation action taken | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | | Content Removed | Content Restricted | Service Restricted |
| Type of policy actioned under | Community Guidelines | 12,844,557 | 60,664,464 | 383,293 |
| | Advertising Policies | 147,773 | N.A | N.A |



This table sets out the number of the content items removed where content is found to violate our Policies, broken down by the sub-policy under our Community Guidelines and our Advertising Policies and by the number of content items removed using our automated moderation technology. Content may violate multiple policies and each violation is reflected in the breakdown of each of the respective sub-policies.

| Type of policy | Detection method | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Total content removed | Content removed automatically |
| Community Guidelines | 12,844,557 | 6,338,072 |
| Youth Safety & Well-Being | 1,935,810 | 12,001 |
| Safety & Civility | 2,163,533 | 821,552 |
| Mental & Behavioral Health | 2,502,197 | 1,699,219 |
| Sensitive & Mature Themes | 5,085,205 | 2,706,519 |
| Regulated Goods & Commercial Activities | 3,582,803 | 2,127,403 |
| Privacy & Security | 277,058 | 175,123 |
| Integrity & Authenticity | 395,933 | 194,127 |
| Advertising Policies | 147,773 | 48,382 |
| Ad Format | 2,195 | 1,194 |
| Adult & Sexual content | 4,885 | 2,139 |
| IP infringement | 7,056 | 1,415 |
| Misleading & False Content | 17,412 | 4,003 |
| Politics & Religion & Culture | 2,242 | 1,148 |
| Prohibited & Restricted Content | 41,210 | 12,807 |
| Prohibited & Restricted Industry | 71,794 | 25,201 |
| Violence & Horror & Dangerous activity | 979 | 475 |



Account-level moderation actions

This table sets out the number of account-level restrictions (i.e. account suspensions or bans) taken against users and advertisers who have been found to have violated our Policies, broken down by the number of accounts actioned using our automated moderation technology.

| | | Type of moderation action taken |
|------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| | | Account ban / suspension |
| | Total removed / suspended | 3,235,602 |
| Detection method | Accounts banned / suspended automatically | 614,882 |



Annex B - Automated Review

This Annex B provides a breakdown of the indicators of accuracy and possible rate of error of our automated moderation technologies across the EU Member States. In our second DSA transparency report, we have captured a broader range of automated enforcement actions when compared to our previous report, and the table below now includes metrics relating to the removal, as well as the restriction, of video and ads content. We consider that the appropriate indicator of accuracy is the proportion of videos and ads where the original enforcement decision was upheld or maintained. We consider that the appropriate indicator of error is the proportion of videos and ads content where the original enforcement decision was overturned.

| Accuracy and Error Rate Across Member States | | |
|--|------------|---------------|
| Country Code | Error rate | Accuracy Rate |
| AT | 1.8% | 98.2% |
| BE | 0.8% | 99.2% |
| BG | 0.9% | 99.1% |
| CY | 1.3% | 98.7% |
| CZ | 0.6% | 99.4% |
| DE | 2.4% | 97.6% |
| DK | 1.0% | 99.0% |
| EE | 0.7% | 99.3% |
| ES | 0.7% | 99.3% |
| FI | 1.3% | 98.7% |
| FR | 1.5% | 98.5% |
| GR | 2.8% | 97.2% |



| Accuracy and Error Rate Across Member States | | |
|--|------------|---------------|
| Country Code | Error rate | Accuracy Rate |
| HR | 1.2% | 98.8% |
| HU | 1.5% | 98.5% |
| IE | 1.1% | 98.9% |
| IT | 1.6% | 98.4% |
| LT | 0.9% | 99.1% |
| LU | 1.3% | 98.7% |
| LV | 2.4% | 97.6% |
| MT | 0.8% | 99.2% |
| NL | 1.5% | 98.5% |
| PL | 2.6% | 97.4% |
| PT | 0.5% | 99.5% |
| RO | 1.2% | 98.8% |
| SE | 0.6% | 99.4% |
| SI | 1.6% | 98.4% |
| SK | 0.4% | 99.6% |



Annex C - Illegal content reports

TikTok has introduced an additional reporting channel for our European Union community to 'Report Illegal Content,' which enables users to alert us to content they believe breaches the law. This Annex C provides a breakdown of the illegal content reports we received from users within the European Union in relation to video, LIVE and ads, broken down by the category of illegal content it has been reported under. We are working hard to ensure we can provide numbers for the remaining illegal content reports across all of our features in future transparency reports.

Where a median time has been provided for an action that has been taken, this has been calculated to take into account the respective number of actions and each feature's median time, in order to provide an accurate representation of the time taken across different features. This applies to median time calculations provided throughout this report.

We received a total number of 131,401 illegal content reports in the European Union, which corresponds to user reports on 63,308 unique items of content. Of the unique items of content reported, we took action against (i) 13,275 items of content on the basis that it violated local laws and (ii) 10,935 items of content on the basis that it breached our Policies. No action was taken on the remaining content reported, either because it was not found to be violative under our Policies or the relevant local laws or because the initial report did not contain enough information.

Median time needed for taking action pursuant to the illegal content reports: The median time between our receipt of an illegal content report and deciding whether or not to action that content under our Policies or applicable law is under 15 hours. The median time necessarily takes account of the time taken to review more complex user reports requiring a nuanced consideration of the legal requirements by a legal reviewer against the applicable local law. Assessing these reports can be a complex task as we strive to be consistent and equitable in our enforcement, while also weighing up our decisions against other important interests such as freedom of expression.

| Category of reported illegal content | Number of user reports received |
|--|---------------------------------|
| Information - related offences / contempt of court | 5496 |
| Content relating to violent or organised crime | 5162 |
| National security-related offences | 3184 |
| Terrorist offences / content | 6034 |
| Illegal goods / services | 11402 |
| Consumer- related offences | 4638 |



| Category of reported illegal content | Number of user reports received |
|--|---------------------------------|
| Child sexual exploitation | 9833 |
| Defamation | 6102 |
| Non-consensual sharing of private or intimate images | 10209 |
| Illegal hate speech | 11771 |
| Illegal privacy- related violations | 14500 |
| Harassment or threats | 8369 |
| Financial crime | 17017 |
| Other illegal content | 17684 |



Annex D - TikTok's content moderators

This Annex D sets out the number of people who are dedicated to content moderation in line with our Policies and applicable local laws, broken down per each of the official European Union languages. These numbers do not reflect the broader teams who also play a key role in keeping our community safe (for example, those involved in the development of our content moderation policies).

Based on calculations undertaken during the reporting period, we have 6287 moderators who are dedicated to moderating content in the European Union, including 413 non-language specific moderators (meaning the moderators who review profiles or photos) that are not reflected in the numbers below which consist of only language moderators. The estimates below are also confined to people who have been assigned to moderate content in one of the 24 official languages in the European Union, however we also have moderators covering a number of other languages that are commonly spoken in the region (for example, Arabic and Turkish).

Our moderators often have linguistic expertise across multiple languages. Where our moderators have linguistic expertise in more than one European Union language, that expertise is reflected in the detailed language breakdown below. For example, the Czech, Slovakian and Slovenian languages are grouped under one category within our Trust & Safety team and are moderated by the same moderators. The moderators allocated for the Croatian language also cover the Serbian language.

| People dedicated to content moderation | |
|--|--|
| Official Member State language | Number of people dedicated to content moderation |
| Bulgarian | 43 |
| Croatian | 17 |
| Czech | 57 |
| Danish | 27 |
| Dutch | 162 |
| English | 2334 |
| Estonian | 7 |
| Finnish | 34 |
| French | 650 |



| People dedicated to content moderation | |
|--|--|
| Official Member State language | Number of people dedicated to content moderation |
| German | 837 |
| Greek | 65 |
| Hungarian | 47 |
| Irish | 0 |
| Italian | 439 |
| Latvian | 10 |
| Lithuanian | 9 |
| Maltese | 0 |
| Polish | 201 |
| Portuguese | 172 |
| Romanian | 136 |
| Slovak | 38 |
| Slovenian | 39 |
| Spanish | 515 |
| Swedish | 111 |



Annex E - Orders from government authorities to remove content

TikTok has a dedicated channel through which government authorities may submit orders to request to remove content. This Annex E provides the numbers of requests received through our dedicated channel from government authorities in the European Union to remove content, broken down by category of illegal content reported.

Between 1 October 2023 and 31 December 2023, we received 77 orders from government authorities in the European Union to remove content.

Median time needed to inform government authority of receipt of order: We acknowledge receipt of an order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel immediately, by sending an automatic acknowledgement.

Median time needed to give effect to the order: The median time between our receipt of a valid order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel and us investigating and actioning, either by removing the content or otherwise providing a substantive response to the issuing government authority, is under 17 hours.

| Orders from government authorities in the European Union to remove content | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------|---------------------------|--|-----------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Category of illegal content | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MS | Child Sexual Exploitation | Terrorist Offences / Content | Illegal Hate Speech | Content Relating to Violent or Organised Crime | Illegal Privacy-Related Violations | Non-Consensual Sharing of Private or Intimate Images | Illegal Goods / Services | Harassment or Threats | Defamation | Consumer-related Offences | Information-Related Offences / Contempt of Court | Financial Crime | National Security-Related Offences | Other Illegal or Harmful Content |
| AT | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | |
| BE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| BG | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CZ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DE | | | 3 | | | | | 2 | | | | | | |
| DK | | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| EE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |



| Orders from government authorities in the European Union to remove content | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------|---------------------------|--|-----------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Category of illegal content | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MS | Child Sexual Exploitation | Terrorist Offences / Content | Illegal Hate Speech | Content Relating to Violent or Organised Crime | Illegal Privacy-Related Violations | Non-Consensual Sharing of Private or Intimate Images | Illegal Goods / Services | Harassment or Threats | Defamation | Consumer-related Offences | Information-Related Offences / Contempt of Court | Financial Crime | National Security-Related Offences | Other Illegal or Harmful Content |
| ES | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | |
| FI | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| FR | | 23 | 11 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | | 12 |
| GR | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HR | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HU | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| IE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| IT | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 4 |
| IT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LU | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LV | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to remove content

Category of illegal content

| MS | Child Sexual Exploitation | Terrorist Offences / Content | Illegal Hate Speech | Content Relating to Violent or Organised Crime | Illegal Privacy-Related Violations | Non-Consensual Sharing of Private or Intimate Images | Illegal Goods / Services | Harassment or Threats | Defamation | Consumer-related Offences | Information-Related Offences / Contempt of Court | Financial Crime | National Security-Related Offences | Other Illegal or Harmful Content |
|-----------|---------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------|---------------------------|--|-----------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| PT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RO | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SE | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 |
| SI | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SK | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |



Annex F - Orders from government authorities to provide information

TikTok has a dedicated channel through which government authorities may submit orders to request disclosure of information. This Annex F provides the number of requests we received through our dedicated channel from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure, broken down by category of illegal content reported.

Between 1 October 2023 and 31 December 2023, we received 2715 orders from government authorities in the European Union for user information disclosure.

Median time needed to inform government authority of receipt of order: We acknowledge receipt of order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel immediately, by sending an automatic acknowledgement.

Median time needed to give effect to the order: The median time between our receipt of a valid order from a government authority submitted through our dedicated channel and us either providing the requested information, or otherwise providing a substantive response to the government authority issuing the order, is under 21 hours. This median time includes time taken to review more complex orders, which can include varying amounts of content, accounts or other identifiers that require processing.

This median time excludes situations where TikTok responds to the requesting government authority to seek clarification or further context in respect of the order, but where the requesting government authority provides no response. Such cases are closed after 28 days.

| Orders from government authorities in the European Union to provide information | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--|----------|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|---------------|------------|-----------|-------------------|----------------|
| Category of illegal content | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MS | Child Exploitation | Criminal Defamation | Domestic Violence | Drug Trafficking | Environmental Crimes Animal Welfare | Extortion Blackmail | Faked Hacked Account | Financial Fraud | Firearms Weapons Possession Explosives | Fugitive | Harassment Bullying | Hate Speech | Homicide Murder | Human Exploitation Trafficking | Intellectual Property | Kidnapping | Missing Adult | Missing Minor | National Security Terrorism | Organized Crime | Physical Assault | Road Traffic Offences | Robbery Theft | Sex Crimes | Sexortion | Suicide Self Harm | Threat To Kill |
| AT | 3 | | | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 10 | 1 | | 9 | 6 | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | 2 | | | | 4 |
| BE | 14 | 1 | | 2 | | | 1 | 2 | | | 18 | | 2 | 1 | | | | 1 | 12 | | 1 | | | 2 | 2 | | 2 |
| BG | 1 | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to provide information

| Category of illegal content | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--|----------|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|---------------|------------|------------|-------------------|----------------|---|
| MS | Child Exploitation | Criminal Defamation | Domestic Violence | Drug Trafficking | Environmental Crimes Animal Welfare | Extortion Blackmail | Faked Hacked Account | Financial Fraud | Firearms Weapons Possession Explosives | Fugitive | Harassment Bullying | Hate Speech | Homicide Murder | Human Exploitation Trafficking | Intellectual Property | Kidnapping | Missing Adult | Missing Minor | National Security Terrorism | Organized Crime | Physical Assault | Road Traffic Offences | Robbery Theft | Sex Crimes | Sextortion | Suicide Self Harm | Threat To Kill | |
| CY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CZ | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DE | 71 | 50 | 4 | 12 | 1 | 29 | 49 | 70 | 9 | 2 | 68 | 168 | 26 | 12 | 18 | | 1 | 3 | 150 | 14 | 29 | 4 | 36 | 59 | 12 | | 43 | |
| DK | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | | | 1 |
| EE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ES | | 6 | 1 | | 2 | 2 | 7 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| FI | 10 | 6 | 12 | | | 2 | 9 | 21 | | | 14 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | | | | | 117 | 4 | 3 | | 3 | 3 | | | 4 |
| FR | 6 | 1 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 3 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | | | | | | 6 |
| GR | 6 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 26 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 25 | 14 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 8 | | 1 | 105 6 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 12 | 15 | 3 | 1 | 17 | |
| HR | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| HU | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| IE | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | | | |
| IT | 2 | 11 | 1 | | | 1 | 3 | 3 | | | 11 | 7 | 1 | | | | | | | 5 | 2 | | 2 | 2 | 1 | | | 5 |



Orders from government authorities in the European Union to provide information

Category of illegal content

| MS | Child Exploitation | Criminal Defamation | Domestic Violence | Drug Trafficking | Environmental Crimes Animal Welfare | Extortion Blackmail | Faked Hacked Account | Financial Fraud | Firearms Weapons Possession Explosives | Fugitive | Harassment Bullying | Hate Speech | Homicide Murder | Human Exploitation Trafficking | Intellectual Property | Kidnapping | Missing Adult | Missing Minor | National Security Terrorism | Organized Crime | Physical Assault | Road Traffic Offences | Robbery Theft | Sex Crimes | Sextortion | Suicide Self Harm | Threat To Kill |
|----|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--|----------|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|---------------|------------|------------|-------------------|----------------|
| LT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LU | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LV | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | |
| MT | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| NL | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | 2 | | | | | | | | 37 | | 1 | | 1 | | | | |
| PL | | 3 | | | | 1 | 1 | 4 | | | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 1 | 1 |
| PT | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RO | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SE | 2 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| SI | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SK | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |



Annex G - Complaints and disputes

TikTok provides notifications to users and advertisers who have violated our Policies or applicable local laws. Users who report content that they believe violates our Policies or applicable local laws are also notified of the outcome of TikTok's decision. In both cases, users can appeal the decision once they receive the notification. This Annex G comprises the number of appeals received from users who have appealed the outcome of content they have reported, as well as users or advertisers who have appealed a decision to remove their video or ads content, or to restrict their access to LIVE. We are working hard to ensure we can provide the numbers for appeals of the remaining moderation actions across all of our features in future transparency reports.

Total number of appeals received: Between 1 October and 31 December 2023, we received 1,588,819 appeals from users and advertisers who uploaded content to the platform and who appealed the moderation action under our Policies to either remove their video or ad content or restrict their access to LIVE. In the same time period, we also received 221,090 appeals from users who reported content which they believed violated our Policies or applicable local laws.

Basis for those complaints: When appealing a decision, in many cases, users and advertisers are given the opportunity to include a written explanation to set out the basis of their appeal. Where users and advertisers are given the opportunity to explain their basis of appeal by free text, the bases of appeals necessarily vary between each user or advertiser submitting an appeal.

Decisions taken in respect of the complaints: Between 1 October and 31 December, we reinstated or removed restrictions from 945,095 pieces of video or ad content, or access to LIVE. In the same period, we removed 12,976 videos or ad content, or access to LIVE, following an appeal from a user who reported content which they believe violated our Policies or applicable local laws. Note that these numbers cannot be compared directly to the number of moderation actions taken or the number of actions appealed in that period. This is because some moderation decisions may have been appealed within the previous time period, and the outcome of some moderation decisions may not be actioned until the next time period.

Median time needed for taking the decisions: The median time for TikTok to decide on an appeal submitted by a user or advertiser on moderation action taken on their content, across all relevant features, is under 5 hours. The median time for TikTok to decide on an appeal submitted by a user on the outcome of content they reported is under 2 hours.



Annex H - Monthly active recipients

This Annex H sets out the average number of 'monthly active recipients' in the European Union broken down per each Member State during the period 1 August 2023 and 31 January 2024, rounded to the nearest hundred thousand.

We have produced this calculation for the purposes of complying with our obligations under the Article 42(3) of the DSA and it should not be relied on for other purposes. We have applied the same methodology used when calculating our total monthly active recipients number for the European Union published in February 2024. In light of our legal requirements to provide the number broken down per Member State and given that users may have accessed the platform from different Member States in the relevant period, the estimates below may mean, in certain limited circumstances, user access is counted more than once.

Where we have shared user metrics in other contexts, the methodology and scope may have differed. Our approach to producing this calculation may evolve or may require altering over time, for example, because of product changes or new technologies.

